!88 [sync] PR-82: fix CVE-2024-56201

From: @openeuler-sync-bot 
Reviewed-by: @dillon_chen 
Signed-off-by: @dillon_chen

0001-disallow-invalid-characters-in-keys-to-xmlattr-filte.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+From d655030770081e2dfe46f90e27620472a502289d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 May 2024 10:19:28 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
+
+---
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst           |  6 ++++++
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py | 11 ++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+index 08a1785..f70cacb 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
++    greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
++    Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
++    as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated first.
++    GHSA-h75v-3vvj-5mfj
++
+ Version 3.1.3
+ -------------
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+index c7ecc9b..c73dd89 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/filters.py
+@@ -248,7 +248,9 @@ def do_items(value: t.Union[t.Mapping[K, V], Undefined]) -> t.Iterator[t.Tuple[K
+     yield from value.items()
+ 
+ 
+-_space_re = re.compile(r"\s", flags=re.ASCII)
++# Check for characters that would move the parser state from key to value.
++# https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#attribute-name-state
++_attr_key_re = re.compile(r"[\s/>=]", flags=re.ASCII)
+ 
+ 
+ @pass_eval_context
+@@ -257,8 +259,13 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+ ) -> str:
+     """Create an SGML/XML attribute string based on the items in a dict.
+ 
+-    If any key contains a space, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Values that
+-    are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically escaped.
++    **Values** that are neither ``none`` nor ``undefined`` are automatically
++    escaped, safely allowing untrusted user input.
++    User input should not be used as **keys** to this filter. If any key
++    contains a space, ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals
++    sign, this fails with a ``ValueError``. Regardless of this, user input
++    should never be used as keys to this filter, or must be separately validated
++    first.
+ 
+     .. sourcecode:: html+jinja
+ 
+@@ -278,6 +285,10 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+     As you can see it automatically prepends a space in front of the item
+     if the filter returned something unless the second parameter is false.
+ 
++    .. versionchanged:: 3.1.4
++        Keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>`` greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign
++        are not allowed.
++
+     .. versionchanged:: 3.1.3
+         Keys with spaces are not allowed.
+     """
+@@ -287,8 +298,8 @@ def do_xmlattr(
+         if value is None or isinstance(value, Undefined):
+             continue
+ 
+-        if _space_re.search(key) is not None:
+-            raise ValueError(f"Spaces are not allowed in attributes: '{key}'")
++        if _attr_key_re.search(key) is not None:
++            raise ValueError(f"Invalid character in attribute name: {key!r}")
+ 
+         items.append(f'{escape(key)}="{escape(value)}"')
+ 
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
+index f50ed13..d8e9114 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_filters.py
+@@ -474,11 +474,12 @@ class TestFilter:
+         assert 'bar="23"' in out
+         assert 'blub:blub="&lt;?&gt;"' in out
+ 
+-    def test_xmlattr_key_with_spaces(self, env):
+-        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Spaces are not allowed"):
+-            env.from_string(
+-                "{{ {'src=1 onerror=alert(1)': 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}"
+-            ).render()
++    @pytest.mark.parametrize("sep", ("\t", "\n", "\f", " ", "/", ">", "="))
++    def test_xmlattr_key_invalid(self, env: Environment, sep: str) -> None:
++        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Invalid character"):
++            env.from_string("{{ {key: 'my_class'}|xmlattr }}").render(
++                key=f"class{sep}onclick=alert(1)"
++            )
+ 
+     def test_sort1(self, env):
+         tmpl = env.from_string("{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort }}|{{ [2, 3, 1]|sort(true) }}")
+-- 
+2.27.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sigurd Spieckermann <sigurd.spieckermann@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 May 2023 14:32:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fix f-string syntax error in code generation
+
+Reference:https://github.com/pallets/jinja/commit/56a724644b1ad9cb03745c10cca732715cdc79e9
+
+---
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 +++
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py |  7 ++++++-
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py  | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+index f70cacb..b0e9a77 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
+ .. currentmodule:: jinja2
+ 
++-   Escape template name before formatting it into error messages, to avoid
++    issues with names that contain f-string syntax.
++    :issue:`1792`, :ghsa:`gmj6-6f8f-6699`
+ -   The ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with ``/`` solidus, ``>``
+     greater-than sign, or ``=`` equals sign, in addition to disallowing spaces.
+     Regardless of any validation done by Jinja, user input should never be used
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+index ff95c80..1ebdcd9 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/compiler.py
+@@ -1121,9 +1121,14 @@ class CodeGenerator(NodeVisitor):
+             )
+             self.writeline(f"if {frame.symbols.ref(alias)} is missing:")
+             self.indent()
++            # The position will contain the template name, and will be formatted
++            # into a string that will be compiled into an f-string. Curly braces
++            # in the name must be replaced with escapes so that they will not be
++            # executed as part of the f-string.
++            position = self.position(node).replace("{", "{{").replace("}", "}}")
+             message = (
+                 "the template {included_template.__name__!r}"
+-                f" (imported on {self.position(node)})"
++                f" (imported on {position})"
+                 f" does not export the requested name {name!r}"
+             )
+             self.writeline(
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
+index 42a773f..b33a877 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_compile.py
+@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
+ import os
+ import re
+ 
++import pytest
++
++from jinja2 import UndefinedError
+ from jinja2.environment import Environment
+ from jinja2.loaders import DictLoader
+ 
+@@ -26,3 +29,19 @@ def test_import_as_with_context_deterministic(tmp_path):
+     expect = [f"'bar{i}': " for i in range(10)]
+     found = re.findall(r"'bar\d': ", content)[:10]
+     assert found == expect
++
++
++def test_undefined_import_curly_name():
++    env = Environment(
++        loader=DictLoader(
++            {
++                "{bad}": "{% from 'macro' import m %}{{ m() }}",
++                "macro": "",
++             }
++        )
++    )
++
++    # Must not raise `NameError: 'bad' is not defined`, as that would indicate
++    # that `{bad}` is being interpreted as an f-string. It must be escaped.
++    with pytest.raises(UndefinedError):
++        env.get_template("{bad}").render()
+-- 
+2.33.0
+

backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From 91a972f5808973cd441f4dc06873b2f8378f30c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lydxn <hlyndon20@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 23 Sep 2024 15:09:10 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] sandbox indirect calls to str.format
+---
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst            |  3 ++
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py  | 81 +++++++++++++++--------------
+ Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py | 18 +++++++
+ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+index f70cacb..e043649 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/CHANGES.rst
+@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ Released 2024-01-10
+ -   ``xmlattr`` filter does not allow keys with spaces. GHSA-h5c8-rqwp-cp95
+ -   Make error messages stemming from invalid nesting of ``{% trans %}`` blocks
+     more helpful. :pr:`1916`
++-   The sandboxed environment handles indirect calls to ``str.format``, such as
++    by passing a stored reference to a filter that calls its argument.
++    :ghsa:`q2x7-8rv6-6q7h`
+ 
+ 
+ Version 3.1.2
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+index 06d7414..dae5a48 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/src/jinja2/sandbox.py
+@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import typing as t
+ from _string import formatter_field_name_split  # type: ignore
+ from collections import abc
+ from collections import deque
++from functools import update_wrapper
+ from string import Formatter
+ 
+ from markupsafe import EscapeFormatter
+@@ -80,20 +81,6 @@ _mutable_spec: t.Tuple[t.Tuple[t.Type, t.FrozenSet[str]], ...] = (
+ )
+ 
+ 
+-def inspect_format_method(callable: t.Callable) -> t.Optional[str]:
+-    if not isinstance(
+-        callable, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
+-    ) or callable.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
+-        return None
+-
+-    obj = callable.__self__
+-
+-    if isinstance(obj, str):
+-        return obj
+-
+-    return None
+-
+-
+ def safe_range(*args: int) -> range:
+     """A range that can't generate ranges with a length of more than
+     MAX_RANGE items.
+@@ -313,6 +300,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+                     except AttributeError:
+                         pass
+                     else:
++                        fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++                        if fmt is not None:
++                            return fmt
+                         if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, argument, value):
+                             return value
+                         return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, argument)
+@@ -330,6 +320,9 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             except (TypeError, LookupError):
+                 pass
+         else:
++            fmt = self.wrap_str_format(value)
++            if fmt is not None:
++                return fmt
+             if self.is_safe_attribute(obj, attribute, value):
+                 return value
+             return self.unsafe_undefined(obj, attribute)
+@@ -345,34 +338,49 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+             exc=SecurityError,
+         )
+ 
+-    def format_string(
+-        self,
+-        s: str,
+-        args: t.Tuple[t.Any, ...],
+-        kwargs: t.Dict[str, t.Any],
+-        format_func: t.Optional[t.Callable] = None,
+-    ) -> str:
+-        """If a format call is detected, then this is routed through this
+-        method so that our safety sandbox can be used for it.
++    def wrap_str_format(self, value: t.Any) -> t.Optional[t.Callable[..., str]]:
++        """If the given value is a ``str.format`` or ``str.format_map`` method,
++        return a new function than handles sandboxing. This is done at access
++        rather than in :meth:`call`, so that calls made without ``call`` are
++        also sandboxed.
+         """
++        if not isinstance(
++            value, (types.MethodType, types.BuiltinMethodType)
++        ) or value.__name__ not in ("format", "format_map"):
++            return None
++
++        f_self: t.Any = value.__self__
++
++        if not isinstance(f_self, str):
++            return None
++
++        str_type: t.Type[str] = type(f_self)
++        is_format_map = value.__name__ == "format_map"
+         formatter: SandboxedFormatter
+-        if isinstance(s, Markup):
+-            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=s.escape)
++
++        if isinstance(f_self, Markup):
++            formatter = SandboxedEscapeFormatter(self, escape=f_self.escape)
+         else:
+             formatter = SandboxedFormatter(self)
+ 
+-        if format_func is not None and format_func.__name__ == "format_map":
+-            if len(args) != 1 or kwargs:
+-                raise TypeError(
+-                    "format_map() takes exactly one argument"
+-                    f" {len(args) + (kwargs is not None)} given"
+-                )
++        vformat = formatter.vformat
++
++        def wrapper(*args: t.Any, **kwargs: t.Any) -> str:
++            if is_format_map:
++                if kwargs:
++                    raise TypeError("format_map() takes no keyword arguments")
++
++                if len(args) != 1:
++                    raise TypeError(
++                        f"format_map() takes exactly one argument ({len(args)} given)"
++                    )
++
++                kwargs = args[0]
++                args = ()
+ 
+-            kwargs = args[0]
+-            args = ()
++            return str_type(vformat(f_self, args, kwargs))
+ 
+-        rv = formatter.vformat(s, args, kwargs)
+-        return type(s)(rv)
++        return update_wrapper(wrapper, value)
+ 
+     def call(
+         __self,  # noqa: B902
+@@ -382,9 +390,6 @@ class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
+         **kwargs: t.Any,
+     ) -> t.Any:
+         """Call an object from sandboxed code."""
+-        fmt = inspect_format_method(__obj)
+-        if fmt is not None:
+-            return __self.format_string(fmt, args, kwargs, __obj)
+ 
+         # the double prefixes are to avoid double keyword argument
+         # errors when proxying the call.
+diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+index 0e8dc5c..9c8bad6 100644
+--- a/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
++++ b/Jinja2-3.1.3/tests/test_security.py
+@@ -171,3 +171,21 @@ class TestStringFormatMap:
+             '{{ ("a{x.foo}b{y}"|safe).format_map({"x":{"foo": 42}, "y":"<foo>"}) }}'
+         )
+         assert t.render() == "a42b&lt;foo&gt;"
++
++
++    def test_indirect_call(self):
++        def run(value, arg):
++            return value.run(arg)
++
++        env = SandboxedEnvironment()
++        env.filters["run"] = run
++        t = env.from_string(
++            """{% set
++                ns = namespace(run="{0.__call__.__builtins__[__import__]}".format)
++            %}
++            {{ ns | run(not_here) }}
++            """
++        )
++
++        with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
++            t.render()
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

backport-update-dependencies.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 3fadee01b712580d811bdd2cb06cd8a1b5ee0821 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Lord <davidism@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2022 10:39:00 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] update dependencies
-
----
- Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
-index 04c921d..77d686e 100644
---- a/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
-+++ b/Jinja2-3.1.2/tests/test_loader.py
-@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ class TestFileSystemLoader:
- 
- class TestModuleLoader:
-     archive = None
-+    mod_env = None
- 
-     def compile_down(self, prefix_loader, zip="deflated"):
-         log = []
-@@ -196,13 +197,14 @@ class TestModuleLoader:
-         self.mod_env = Environment(loader=loaders.ModuleLoader(self.archive))
-         return "".join(log)
- 
--    def teardown(self):
--        if hasattr(self, "mod_env"):
-+    def teardown_method(self):
-+        if self.archive is not None:
-             if os.path.isfile(self.archive):
-                 os.remove(self.archive)
-             else:
-                 shutil.rmtree(self.archive)
-             self.archive = None
-+            self.mod_env = None
- 
-     def test_log(self, prefix_loader):
-         log = self.compile_down(prefix_loader)
--- 
-2.33.0
-

python-jinja2.spec

@@ -1,17 +1,19 @@
 %global _name Jinja2
 
 Name:           python-jinja2
-Version:        3.1.2
+Version:        3.1.3
-Release:        2
+Release:        4
 Summary:        A full-featured template engine for Python
 License:        BSD-3-Clause
 URL:            http://jinja.pocoo.org/
 Source0:        https://files.pythonhosted.org/packages/source/J/Jinja2/Jinja2-%{version}.tar.gz
 
-Patch1:      	backport-update-dependencies.patch
-
 BuildArch:      noarch
 
+Patch0001:      0001-disallow-invalid-characters-in-keys-to-xmlattr-filte.patch 
+Patch0002:      backport-CVE-2024-56326.patch
+Patch0003:      backport-CVE-2024-56201.patch
+
 %description
 Jinja2 is one of the most used template engines for Python. It is inspired by Django's
 templating system but extends it with an expressive language that gives template authors
@@ -64,6 +66,33 @@ popd
 %doc Jinja2-%{version}/examples
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Dec 26 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.1.3-4
+- Type: CVE
+- CVE: CVE-2024-56201
+- SUG: NA
+- DESC: fix CVE-2024-56201
+
+* Thu Dec 26 2024 changtao <changtao@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-3
+- Type: CVE
+- CVE: CVE-2024-56326
+- SUG: NA
+- DESC: fix CVE-2024-56326
+
+* Tue May 7 2024 xuchenchen <xuchenchen@kylinos.cn> - 3.1.3-2
+- Type: CVE
+- CVE: CVE-2024-34064
+- SUG: NA
+- DESC: fix disallow invalid characters in keys to xmlattr filter
+
+* Thu Jan 25 2024 shixuantong <shixuantong1@huawei.com> - 3.1.3-1
+- Upgrade package to 3.1.3
+
+* Thu Jan 18 2024 weihaohao <weihaohao2@huawei.com> - 3.1.2-3
+- Type:CVE
+- CVE:CVE-2024-22195
+- SUG:NA
+- DESC:fix CVE-2024-22195
+
 * Mon Jul 31 2023 zhuofeng <zhuofeng2@huawei.com> - 3.1.2-2
 - fix test failed